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Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad 
public goods and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, 
politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents and to private transfers 
that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to 
imperfections in political markets that are greater in some countries than in others. We 
review the theory and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack 
of credibility of political promises, and social polarization, on political incentives. We argue 
that the effects of these imperfections are large but insufficiently integrated into the design 
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One way in which governments can accelerate economic development is through their 
decisions regarding public expenditures. Allocated appropriately, public expenditures can 
overcome market failures that exacerbate poverty, such as the inability of the poor to borrow 
for education, their lack of information about preventive health care, or the externalities that 
exacerbate public health hazards to which the poor are most exposed. However, distortion 
and misallocation of public expenditures are common and often undermine development. 
Public expenditures flow to wage bills for bulky state administrations, to farm subsidies 
absorbed by the wealthiest farmers, or to public works projects with limited public utility, all 
at the expense of quality public services.  
Misallocation has persisted despite a sea change in the way in which governments are 
selected and remain in office. From 1990 to 2000, the number of countries governed by 
officials elected in competitive elections rose from 60 to 100.1 A large fraction of voters in 
many of these countries are low income, if not poor in the strictest and most technical sense 
of the word. Democratization might be expected to benefit these voters. However, policy-
makers in poor democracies regularly divert expenditures away from those areas that most 
benefit the poor, or fail to implement policies that improve those services from which the 
poor are known to benefit disproportionately.  
In most countries, the distribution of income is skewed to the right—towards the 
higher end of the income spectrum—so that the income of the median voter is less than the 
average income of all voters. Under these circumstances, government should be larger and 
social services should be correspondingly more extensive (Meltzer and Richard 1981). 
However, this prediction actually exacerbates the puzzle of why many countries severely 
under-provide social services, since it is in many countries where the poor are the median 
voters that social services are often the most woeful. Moreover, there is little evidence that 
redistribution is greater in countries with greater income inequality (Knack and Keefer 1997). 
There are numerous imperfections in political markets that help to explain this puzzle. In 
this paper, we review the theory and evidence on the impact of political market 
imperfections, and develop the implications of these findings for the structure and design of 
policy interventions meant to improve the allocation of resources.  
The Millennium Development Goals and many efforts around the world to 
“empower” the poor, whether through devolved decisionmaking or through participatory 
budgeting, are all responses to these failures of government expenditure policies. These 
efforts have generally not explicitly addressed the political market imperfections that have 
                                                 
1According to the number of countries reported in Beck and others (2001), Database of Political 
Institutions, as having competitive elections for executive and legislative office (EIEC and LIEC equal to 
seven).   
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distorted political incentives to serve the poor. In this paper, we focus on three political 
market imperfections that we argue are particularly important in distorting political 
incentives to provide high quality public services: lack of information among voters about 
politician performance; social fragmentation among voters manifested as identity-based 
voting; and lack of credibility of political promises to citizens. We show that existing efforts 
to improve the quality of public policy towards the poor may fall far short of achieving their 
goals unless they are expanded to address specifically these imperfections.  
One difficult conclusion that we reach is that broad public services most important 
to the poor—health and education—are also the services most vulnerable to these three 
distortions of the political marketplace. It is especially difficult for voters to assess the quality 
and efficiency of service provision and to evaluate the responsibility of specific political 
actors for service breakdowns. By the same token, political competitors find it especially 
difficult to make credible promises about service provision. Moreover, politicians in many 
countries can only make credible promises to narrow groups of voters. For these voters, it 
may be politically more efficient to promise narrow targetable goods, such as infrastructure 
provision, than it is to promise improvements in broad public services. Social fragmentation 
in the electorate exacerbates these problems of voter coordination in determining reward 
and punishment based upon political actions towards the quality of public services. To the 
extent that in developing countries, poor voters are more likely to vote in uninformed ways, 
being susceptible to campaign slogans, or polarized along non-economic ideological 
dimensions such as religion or ethnic identity, and political promises are particularly lacking 
in credibility or prone to clientelism, it is precisely the broad social services that are most 
likely to suffer. 
We point in the next section to pervasive failures of social service provision and 
argue that low demand for social services on the part of the poor is an unlikely explanation 
for these failures. A few simple theoretical illustrations then serve to identify the different 
factors that interfere with the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable for the quantity 
and quality of social services. The impact, particularly on social service provision, of each of 
these imperfections in political markets—information constraints, social polarization, and 
problems of political credibility—is then assessed.  
The latter part of the paper demonstrates how the political market imperfections on 
which we focus help explain one of the more striking contrasts in government policymaking, 
the famous cases of the states of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala in India. We argue that the lack 
of voter information, greater social polarization and the non-credibility of political party 
platforms in the former state explains its failed social services relative to the well-performing  
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services of Kerala. We conclude by exploring some implications of this political economy 
analysis for policy initiatives to improve the allocation of public resources. 2 
Politics and Social Services  
The electoral market imperfections that we explore below help to explain a well-
known distortion in public spending, in rich and poor democracies: the preference of 
governments to spend on targeted programs, such as government jobs or infrastructure 
investment, rather than on improvements in broad social services. Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and 
Zhu (1998) find that when foreign aid is targeted at education, it is more likely to be offset 
by reductions in own-government financing of education. When aid is used to support 
public infrastructure investment (transportation and communications), however, the 
opposite is true: governments are likely to maintain their own fiscal effort in the provision of 
these goods. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Pande (2003) have shown that when 
disadvantaged groups in India—the landless poor and scheduled castes (respectively)—were 
newly able to elect their own representatives, more government resources flowed towards 
these disadvantaged groups. However, these increased flows largely took the form of 
increased access to government jobs and targeted welfare transfers. Enhanced political rights 
did not translate into improved education or access to other broad-based social services, 
though the resource cost of such improvements, relative to likely welfare gains, could have 
been much smaller.3  
The preference of politicians for “pork barrel” or targetable spending is not the 
exclusive province of developing countries, and is widely documented in the United States 
(see, for example, Mayhew 1974). The problem for development is that many governments 
have exaggerated preferences for targeted expenditures at the expense of untargeted health 
                                                 
2 Our focus on fundamental characteristics of electoral competition is complementary to another 
literature (reviewed by Persson and Tabellini 2002) looking at the impact of electoral and political 
institutions on government decisionmaking. This literature begins with assumptions about the extent of 
voter information, their ideological predilections and the credibility of electoral promises and identifies the 
incentive effects of the rules of electoral competition and political decisionmaking. It shows that whether 
countries exhibit presidential or parliamentary regimes or employ majoritarian or proportional electoral 
rules, for example, have significant effects on spending. Presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral 
systems spend less in total or less on public goods. The impact of institutions should depend on the 
environment in which elections are conducted. In fact, preliminary work suggests that the magnitude of the 
institutional results varies significantly depending on the underlying electoral characteristics of countries 
that are the focus here. For example, in poorer or younger democracies, where voters are less likely to be 
informed and political competitors are less likely to be credible, the difference in government spending 
between presidential and parliamentary systems is less than half what it is in richer or older democracies. 
The analysis and review in this paper are therefore a logical first step in a full and comprehensive analysis 
of the political economy of government expenditures and the poor.  
3 In their review of research on public spending and the poor, Van de Walle and Nead (1995) find that 
resources spent on basic health and education services (“broadly” targeted fiscal policies) have higher 
payoffs for the poor than finely targeted food subsidies or other redistribution schemes, in part because of 
the administrative costs and behavioral consequences of the targeted schemes.  
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and education services that would more heavily benefit poorer landowners and landless 
laborers. For example, the bulk of expenditures in health and education typically flow to the 
salaries of teachers and health workers, yet rampant absenteeism and shirking by these 
service providers means that no services are effectively provided in many cases. That is, 
governments use these resources to provide (targetable) jobs rather than (less targetable) 
high quality services.4 Service delivery falls far below the levels that even poorer countries 
can afford, suggesting that the tradeoffs between targeted and non-targeted public 
expenditures are much steeper in these countries than in developed countries.  
This evidence underscores a general point. Although the allocation of public 
expenditures away from the poor is often framed as a problem of “capture” by the “rich” of 
the levers of government policymaking, difficult allocation problems persist even when 
government expenditure programs are “pro-poor.” Such programs frequently take the form 
of targeted (and often unsustainable) redistribution programs, such as free food and 
temporary employment in public works, even when other, cheaper and broad-based 
programs to improve basic health and education services would have a bigger impact on 
welfare.  
In many cases, of course, the problem is not only that the poor receive inefficient 
targeted transfers rather than more efficient public goods, but that apparently broad-based 
programs benefit mainly special interests or the rich. Bates (1981) has shown for Africa that 
agricultural subsidies, such as price protection and subsidized electricity, disproportionately 
benefit middle and large farmers, who grow the protected crops and are more likely to 
engage in capital-intensive, power-driven private irrigation. India provides a wealth of 
examples, ranging from power subsidies to fertilizer subsidies, exhibiting the same 
characteristics. Once again, such biases are well-known in all democracies but are particularly 
extreme in many developing countries.  
Understanding the variation in political market imperfections across countries that 
give rise to these exaggerated preferences is the goal of this paper. In particular, the paper 
asks: under what conditions can voters provide stronger incentives for politicians and service 
providers to provide high quality public services to all rather than targeted transfers, 
particularly targeted to rich special interests?  
Although the analysis here focuses on the supply side – the incentives of political 
actors to provide public services—one might naturally be concerned that failures of social 
service provision in some countries are rooted in the demand side. Voters in poor countries 
                                                 
4 In India, recurrent expenditures on primary education accounts for 98 percent of total government 
expenditure on primary education; salaries account for 96 percent of recurrent expenditures, and teachers’ 
salaries account for 97 percent of all salaries in education spending (Tilak 1993, p. 60). Yet, field 
investigations in rural areas of Indian states, particularly in the north, reveal that teacher absenteeism is 
endemic, with almost two-thirds of the teachers employed in the sample schools absent at the time of the 
investigators’ unannounced visits (Drèze and Gazdar 1996; Weiner 1991; Prasad 1987).  
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may simply not value health or education provision by the government. Scheduled caste 
members and the landless poor may similarly be unaware of the importance of education or, 
aware of the importance of education, but nevertheless prefer that their politicians provide 
other services.  
Ignorance of the value of education seems not to be a sustainable thesis. A common 
finding of village studies and household surveys in India is that education is widely perceived 
by members of disadvantaged groups as the most promising chance for a better life for their 
children (Drèze and Sen 1995). Farmers, landless laborers, and scheduled caste members 
therefore know the importance of education for their children. 
A thought experiment also makes clear that demand side considerations alone cannot 
explain why, even if fully informed about the value of education, the landless poor might still 
prefer targeted jobs. Suppose that a village must choose between demanding a single job for 
some, randomly chosen individual in the village, or the presence of a teacher from outside 
the village. Suppose the village has thirty families and that the teacher would instruct one 
child from each family. Further, assume that literacy raises the present value of each child’s 
lifetime income by 30 percent, that literacy takes five years of education to achieve, and that 
the present value of each child’s income, absent education, would be the same on average as 
that of the average wage earner in any of their families. Then the total value to all 30 families 
from having the teacher (assuming the teacher is guaranteed to stay for five years) would be 
0.3 * 30 * (the present value of the average wage earner’s lifetime income).  
To match this wealth effect, and even assuming that the job offered in lieu of a 
teacher was guaranteed for the life of the recipient rather than for only five years, the job 
would still have to pay ten times the average wage to make the expected value of the job to 
the village the same as the expected value of the teacher. The demand for education would 
therefore have to be extraordinarily low, for example because returns to education are low, 
or discount rates are high, or severe credit market constraints block access to complementary 
inputs (books, foregone child labor), to explain the apparent preference of the poor in many 
developing countries for jobs and subsidies over schools and clinics. However, because we 
observe the poor making large sacrifices to educate their children—for example, in private 
institutions—despite imperfect credit markets and discount rates that are not particularly 
low, it makes sense to look beyond demand-side issues in asking why voters in some 
countries do not pressure politicians to provide high quality education. 
When Does Political Competition Lead to the Optimal Provision of Public 
Goods? 
A simple illustration indicates the stringency of the conditions under which elected 
officials always provide the socially optimal level of public goods. By implication, the 
example makes clear how imperfections in political markets can undermine the incentives of  
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political decisionmakers to provide optimal government services to citizens. In this 
“benchmark” society, all political promises are credible, politicians cannot make targeted 
transfers (transfers to some voters but not others), voters are identical, and voters can 
observe at no cost the contribution that politicians make to their welfare. Under these 
conditions, the public good preferences of voters always translate into actual government 
policy.  
To see this, assume there are Ν identical voters, whose individual welfare W is given 
by c + V(g), where g is the amount spent on public goods, c is consumption and V(g) is the 
utility from public spending; c = y(1 - τ), or income net of a uniform tax τ, and g = τΝy. The 
welfare of the average or median voter (the same in this case, since all voters are identical) is 
therefore maximized by public good provision g* such that Vg(g*) = -1/Νy.5 This is precisely 
the level of public good provision that maximizes total social welfare (taken to be the sum of 
the welfare of all Ν voters). Any candidate who deviates from the policy promise g* and τ = 
g*/Νy is defeated by any candidate who offers this optimal policy package, since all voters 
prefer g* to any other g.  
The example is unrealistic for many reasons. However, each of the deviations from 
reality illuminates a political obstacle to the broad-based delivery of quality social services by 
government. One key assumption in the benchmark model is that voters can costlessly 
observe the contribution of politicians to policy changes and the connection between 
government policy and their own welfare. Politicians therefore always get credit or blame for 
the actions they take or fail to take on behalf of voters. Imperfect voter information makes it 
difficult for voters to assign credit or blame, and therefore increases political incentives and 
scope for rent-seeking. Persson and Tabellini (2000) argue that the larger the density of 
citizens who are uninformed and therefore vote randomly (that is, with complete disregard 
for policy promises and outcomes), the greater is political rent extraction in equilibrium. In 
the limit, if voters are utterly ignorant about politician responsibility for government policy 
or about the contribution of policy to their own welfare, the results from the benchmark 
model entirely reverse and no public goods at all are provided.  
Voters are also assumed to be identical in the benchmark model. Obviously, though, 
voters differ on a host of margins, including income, ideology, religious belief, language, the 
value they attach to different public goods, occupation and location. All of these affect their 
preferences for government policies and public goods, and make the coordination problem 
of setting a threshold for re-election of candidates more difficult. If voters have strong 
preferences for or against specific candidates or parties, independent of the policy choices of 
these parties, social service provision can suffer significantly. It is easy to show the 
potentially devastating impact of ideological preferences on outcomes in the ideal world.  
                                                 
5 Rewrite welfare in terms of g and maximize with respect to g.  
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Imagine that there are only two political parties competing for votes. Some voters 
derive utility from the election of party A and disutility from the election of party B, and the 
remaining voters derive utility from party A and disutility from party B. For simplicity, voters 
who prefer party A are identical in their preference for party A, as are the voters who prefer 
party B. Further, the disutility that voters get when their non-preferred party is elected is 
exactly equal to the utility they get if their preferred party is elected, and the amounts of 
utility and disutility for each group of voters are the same. That is, for all voters, the utility 
they get if their preferred party is elected is ε, and the disutility they get if their non-preferred 
party is elected is -ε. As before, politicians representing each party make promises regarding 
public goods and elections are held. When ideological polarization is severe enough, 
however, politician promises regarding public goods are irrelevant.  
Consider, for example, a situation in which half of all voters prefer party A and half 
prefer party B. If party A is elected, voters who prefer party A receive WA = c + V(gA) + ε 
and voters who prefer party B receive WB = c + V(gA) - ε , where gA is the level of public 
goods promised by party A. Conversely, if party B is elected, welfare outcomes for each 
group of voters are given by WA = c + V(gB) - ε  and voters who prefer party B receive  
WB = c + V(gB)+ ε. If ideological preferences are zero, ε = 0, the two parties both promise 
g*. However, as ε grows, voters become more willing to vote for their preferred party even if 
that party promises fewer public goods than the non-preferred party. If social polarization is 
sufficiently high and ε sufficiently large so that V(g*) + y(1 – g*/y) - ε < V(g) + y(1 – g/y) +ε 
for all g, or V(g*) - V(g) + g – g* < 2ε , there is nothing that the non-preferred party can 
promise prior to the election that will convince the supporters of the other party to switch 
their allegiance. The welfare that the supporters of the other party receive from electing their 
own party, even if their own party provides no public goods at all, is greater than the welfare 
that they receive if the other party is elected and provides the optimal level of public goods.6 
The third key assumption of policymaking in the ideal world is that pre-electoral 
promises are binding on the election winners. This is clearly counterfactual: electoral 
promises are not legally enforceable anywhere. Instead, the credibility of campaign promises 
depends on the reputation of either the individual candidate making the promises or of the 
political party to which candidates belong. In many cases—such as young democracies—
reputations are weak or have been established for only a limited number of issues. Individual 
politicians or parties may be well-known and believable as freedom fighters or as defenders 
of a religious faith, but have no reputation with regard to education, health services or 
economic policy.  
When electoral promises are not credible, challengers are in a much weaker position 
with respect to incumbents. Even if voters observe bad incumbent performance, challengers 
are hard-pressed to convince voters that they would do better, since none of their claims is 
                                                 
6 Governments cannot extract rents in the ideal world. If they could, they would be easier to extract in 
a polarized world, where voters prefer parties regardless of their policy performance or rent-seeking.   
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credible. Incumbents are therefore strengthened and thereby entirely or almost entirely freed 
from the need to respond to electoral pressures. This is a pervasive problem in young 
democracies, which has been extensively analyzed.  
If, as in Robinson and Verdier (2002), no promises are credible, politicians have no 
incentive at all to pursue the public interest except to the extent that it directly improves 
their own private welfare. For example, incumbents might approve public expenditures on 
roads as long as the roads pass by their privately-owned factories. In this limiting case, non-
credible politicians set the tax rate τ to maximize the rents that they can extract from the 
economy during their expected time in office and provide no public goods whatsoever. 
Elections are almost meaningless in this context. Ferejohn (1986), however, shows that 
elections can serve the purpose of removing from power an incumbent that has performed 
poorly, if voters can implicitly coordinate to establish some threshold of performance that 
the incumbents must meet if they are to be re-elected. Such a threshold provides only weak 
voter control over incumbents, since incumbents always have the opportunity of “looting” – 
taking all of the rents possible in a given period and foregoing any chance for re-election.  
Persson and Tabellini (Chapter 8, 2000) refine the Ferejohn model, introducing the 
possibility that politicians can make targeted transfers as well as provide public goods. They 
show that if, for example, politicians need to attract the votes of 51 percent of the electorate 
in order to be elected, incumbents provide public goods as if only 51 percent of voters 
benefited from them rather than all voters. This implies significant under-provision of the 
public good. An attempt by any majority of voters to demand a higher level of public goods 
would be undercut, because the incumbent could always offer targeted transfers to a few 
voters that offer greater welfare than the extra public good but are cheaper for the 
incumbent to provide. However, since all voters would like to receive such transfers, they 
bid them down to zero.  
The Ferejohn-style model may be somewhat more realistic, despite its reliance on an 
apparently strong assumption of voter coordination. In countries with weak and non-
credible political parties, it is common for voters to reject incumbents after particularly bad 
performance, but to be unable to demand better performance from successors. Keefer 
(2000b) introduces yet another variant of the credibility argument that may be still more 
realistic. He argues that politicians in every country can make credible promises to some 
voters, but that in many countries those voters have personal ties to the candidate—for 
example, the ties described by the “patron-client” relationships that a large literature has 
identified with the politics of developing countries. Such “partial” credibility also undermines 
political incentives to provide public goods.  
The benchmark model assumes that governments can only provide public goods. 
However, in every country the ability to make targeted transfers is a key weapon in the 
political arsenal and almost always directly conflicts with the goal of providing efficient 
public services to those who most benefit from them. Benefits are targeted according to  
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political calculations that need not and often do not coincide with technocratic notions of 
targeting, which emphasize targeting according to other criteria, such as need. Political and 
program targeting criteria need not and usually do not coincide, undermining adequate social 
delivery.  
To see the implications of political targeting, one can assume Ν identical voters, as 
before, and allow individual voter welfare W to be given by c + V(g) + mi, where mi is a 
transfer from the government to voter i. As before, c is y(1 - τ), but τΝy = g + Σmi. For even 
the slightest deadweight loss from taxation, m should be zero since the utility gain of 
transfers to any voter is offset by an equal utility loss borne by other voters. However, there 
are many possible realistic scenarios under which politicians would prefer only to provide m. 
If voters can only verify promises related to the direct provision of targeted goods (e.g., a 
job), but not of broad public goods (e.g., efforts to improve school quality), politicians have 
an incentive to provide only transfers to voters. 7 If most voters are ideologically polarized, 
but some are not, politicians would compete by making promises only to the ideologically 
uncommitted. If this group were small enough, its members would prefer all tax revenue to 
be used to provide them with targeted transfers than with public goods that would benefit all 
citizens.8  
Regardless of which model is more appropriate, the examples drive home a point 
that reappears throughout the discussion in this paper. Any set of institutions that can 
sustainably guarantee accountable and responsive government includes competitive 
elections, but elections by themselves are far from a sufficient condition for good 
governance given imperfections in the market for political competition. Each of these 
imperfections—information asymmetries, social polarization, and non-credibility of political 
promises—is explored in greater detail in the sections that follow. In every case, substantial 
evidence suggests that these imperfections are important sources of distortion in political 
markets and that reform efforts designed to improve the access of the poor to quality social 
services need to address them explicitly in order to be successful.  
The Impact of Imperfect Information on the Provision of Social Services to the 
Poor  
                                                 
7 In the absence of additional structure, there is no equilibrium policy outcome in the simple model of 
targeted transfers. There is no offer of transfers and public goods that is invulnerable to defeat by some 
other offer. Transfers to each voter each constitute a different policy dimension and Plott (1967) shows that 
majority rule with a multi-dimensional policy space is unlikely. Many of the political institutions discussed 
in this paper solve this problem. For example, most political systems grant agenda setting authority to some 
elected officials but not to others. Those officials can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to other policymakers, 
thus offering an institutional solution to the problem of policy instability introduced by politically targeted 
transfers. Such institutional innovations tend to give rise to their own distortions.  
8 That is, for any amount of tax revenue, a small group of k swing voters would prefer transfers to 
public good provision as long as Vg <1/k, where 1/k is the marginal utility gain for members of this group of 
an additional unit of transfers to them.  
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Incomplete information is at the heart of most theories of the breakdown of political 
markets. It is therefore worth recalling first that the presence of well-informed voters is not 
always necessary to persuade politicians to follow policies that benefit the society. Detailed 
behavioral studies in the United States have shown that voters adopt simple voting criteria 
based on very limited information about politics and public policies (various articles in 
Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990). Motivated by these findings, Fiorina and Shepsle (1990) and 
Chappell and Keech (1990) argue that citizens can employ voting rules requiring very little 
information and still motivate politicians to pursue policies in their interest. Ferejohn (1990, 
pp 8-9) paraphrases this process as follows: “find a way to get the electorate to commit itself 
to act as though it is a simple principal with a one-dimensional set of rewards. In this way, 
incumbents will be prevented from taking advantage of the conflicting interests in the 
electorate”. Hence, if the electorate in aggregate is able to coordinate on a common set of 
issues then politicians would have incentives to pursue policies as defined by those issues. 
Policy choices are therefore determined by those issues that voters are informed about and 
choose to coordinate their voting decisions upon.  
Fiorina (1990) emphasizes that most of the information people use to make voting 
decisions is essentially “free”, in that it comes with the ordinary performance of social and 
economic roles. However, the poor have less access to “free” or nearly free information and, 
in any case, such information is less widely available in developing countries. Newspapers are 
either of lower quality, or few in number, or available only to the minority of literate voters, 
while radio and television stations are often state-controlled. In addition, the content of 
“free” information can vary widely over the electorate depending on the differentiation of 
occupations in the economy and the variability of social settings. Citizens then specialize in 
information about some things rather than others, inhibiting coordination (Ferejohn 1990; 
Iyengar 1990; Ottati and Wyer 1990). In countries where limited media reach and difficult 
transportation and communications systems divide the electorate, this problem is 
exacerbated. It is a small leap to the conclusion that the information base of poor, rural 
citizens of developing countries is therefore skewed in a way that detracts from their ability 
to hold elected officials accountable for the quality of public services.  
There is very little systematic empirical evidence on the nature of information 
available to poor voters and used by them to evaluate their political representatives. Some 
econometric and some anecdotal evidence suggests that poor voters are more susceptible to 
reward (or punish) politicians for exogenous changes that affect their welfare, for short-lived 
policies or campaign promises just before elections, or for targeted policies where the actions 
of political agents are immediately visible. All of these information problems reduce political 
incentives to effectively provide broad social services.  
Poor voters are less able to disentangle the contribution that elected officials have 
made to their welfare from the contribution made by exogenous circumstances, such as due 
to forces of “nature”. In India, for example, it appears that state governments tend to lose  
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elections in years of poor rainfall. But this effect of voters making errors in their assessment 
of politician performance when confronted by noisy environmental signals is also evident in 
developed countries. Wolfers (2002) finds that voters in oil-producing states in the United 
States tend to re-elect incumbent governors during global oil price rises and vote them out 
of office when the oil price drops.9  
Poor voters are more likely to place excessive weight on the recent or the 
immediately visible, thereby creating perverse political incentives to boost spending and to 
divert funds to short-term visible objectives shortly before elections. Although evidence for 
electoral budget cycles in developed countries is at best ambiguous, Shi and Svensson (2002), 
Block (2002), and Schuknecht (2000) find large electoral cycles in monetary and fiscal 
instruments in developing countries. Shi and Svensson (2002) establish a direct link between 
electoral budget cycles and limited information available to voters, showing that some of the 
difference in the size of political budget cycles across countries is due to variation in access 
to free media—the greater is access, the smaller are the observed budget cycles.  
This emphasis on the recent and visible is a particular problem for investments in 
some public services for which the measurable outcomes of policy change may not emerge 
for several years after the policy action has been taken, or where outcomes are noisy signals 
of politician effort and ability. The effects of education reforms, for example, are typically 
difficult to verify until a cohort of students has been exposed to them for a sufficient period 
of time. Even then, it is difficult to credit politicians with the improvement in performance 
of a school or a clinic, as outcomes depend critically on the day-to-day performance of other 
agents such as teachers or doctors, and impact of political actions, such as institutional 
reforms that improve provider accountability, are more opaque. In contrast, policy actions 
such as building a highway, or building a school, are both more visible and easier to attribute 
to political agents.10 Although there is little evidence of large scale swings in spending 
around election times in an older democracy in the developing world, India, Khemani (2003) 
does find that the composition of spending and revenues changes, possibly to target special 
interest groups in exchange for campaign support. As the time of elections draws near, state 
governments in India increase expenditures on public investment projects and away from 
more broad-based categories of spending on public services, and provide targeted tax breaks 
to narrow groups of producers possibly in exchange for campaign finance. 
                                                 
9 Filtering out performance from noisy signals in outcomes is a pervasive issue in principal-agent 
problems, and not somehow restricted to or especially intractable for the citizen-politician agency problem. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, p. 1) find, for example, that CEO pay “responds about as much to a 
lucky dollar as to a general [earned] dollar”.  
10 Mani and Mukand (2002) show that if elections serve the purpose of voters choosing amongst 
candidates to select the most competent one, then resource allocation will be biased against those public 
goods whose outcomes are more noisy and harder to use to assess politician ability, as politicians will have 
the incentive to provide other goods that are better signals of high ability.  
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Rather than being influenced by independent evaluations of the performance records 
of competing candidates, uninformed voters’ decisions are swayed by political campaigns 
and advertisements, thereby creating a role for special interests to purchase narrowly targeted 
policies by providing campaign finance (Baron 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1996). Special 
interests could be single firms, groups of manufacturers, farmers, public sector employees, or 
subsidized retail store owners.11 They need not be rich, but they are, by definition, informed. 
To the extent that the poor are disproportionately uninformed, therefore, the organized 
poor are likely to be under-represented as special interests. Similarly, to the extent that voters 
in developing countries are less informed, broad public policies are likely to be distorted in 
favor of special interests.  
One policy consequence is simply that imperfectly informed voters are less well-
served by government. The flip side of this argument is that governments accountable only 
to uninformed voters can be more vigorous in the pursuit of their own private interests. 
Because uninformed voters cannot easily identify the effect of rent-seeking on their welfare, 
politicians have greater scope to extract rents (Persson and Tabellini 2000).  
There is recently emerging evidence that when voters are informed about particular 
policies they are able to extract greater resources and better performance from political 
agents. Strömberg (2001) finds that between 1933 and 1935 in the United States, federal 
assistance to low-income households was greater in those counties where more households 
had radios and were thus more likely to be informed about government policies and 
programs. The spread of the radio particularly improved information access for rural voters, 
who were previously disadvantaged relative to urban voters (since the latter already had 
access to alternative sources of information such as newspapers, while radio waves made it 
easier to deliver information to remote areas). It accounted for as much as 20 percent greater 
allocation of social assistance funds to a rural county as compared to an identical urban 
county. Besley and Burgess (2003) find that state governments in India are more responsive 
to declines in food production and crop flood damage via public food distribution and 
calamity relief expenditure when newspaper circulation, particularly in local languages, is 
greater.  
While telling, this evidence does not inform the broader question of whether policy 
is more socially beneficial when voters are more informed. In particular, it is not clear that 
informed voters were more “deserving” of transfers, nor can one draw the conclusion from 
this evidence that more informed voters heighten government incentives to provide public 
goods. It could, for example, be the case that the mass media better enabled politicians to 
take credit for targeted payoffs to particular constituencies, leading them to reduce 
expenditures on public goods or on broad-based social programs. The evidence provided by 
both Strömberg (2001) and Besley and Burgess (2003) is based on information about 
                                                 
11 Alderman (1988) describes protests in Pakistan by retailers of government subsidized wheat and 
flour when their livelihood was placed at risk because of amendments in the subsidies program.   
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targeted transfers, which is perhaps an area of public policy that the poor are more informed 
about given that they are the intended beneficiaries of redistributive programs. Yet, 
information distortions in favor of targeted programs may further blunt political incentives 
to provide broad social services. 
The negative impact on the poor of information distortions in political markets 
therefore arises on two counts. The poor are less likely to be informed, with less access to 
universal sources of information, such as newspapers and radio, as well as to accurate 
informal information networks, and therefore less likely to receive government resources. At 
the same time, the poor rely most on the publicly provided social services for which 
information problems are the most acute, and most likely to lead to such services being 
underprovided. Health and education are transactions-intensive and depend critically on day-
to-day provider behavior; outcomes are sensitive to provider discretion as well as to the 
overall policy parameters of the sector. Reforms affecting teacher performance in the 
classroom or rates of infection in hospitals are not easily observed by voters. For example, 
voters can easily verify that politicians have complied with a promise to bring a teacher to 
their school. They can less easily verify that the teacher is good, or that the teacher will 
remain for a sufficient period of time to deliver high benefits to the village. If politicians 
cannot take credit for their efforts to improve teacher quality, they provide and voters expect 
low-quality teachers.  
The quality problem is exacerbated when the political rewards are high from 
targeting particular providers for contracts or jobs, including teaching jobs. Since voters do 
not give the politician credit for providing them with high quality teachers, anyway (since 
they cannot observe quality), politicians have an incentive to use their clout to fill teaching 
jobs with the nieces and nephews of constituents, regardless of their professional 
qualifications. In fact, the lower the quality of the service provider, the higher the rents that 
providers receive and the greater their debt to the politicians. Gazdar (2000) and the World 
Bank (1998, 2001) make it clear that non-professional qualifications are key factors in the 
placement of teachers in Pakistan. Similar reports from the Dominican Republic suggest that 
posting of teachers is highly discretionary and not clearly related to educational concerns 
(Keefer 2002a).  
Information problems may thus lead poor voters to give greater credit to politicians 
for initiating public works projects (including school construction), providing direct 
subsidies for essential commodities, and increasing employment in the public sector 
(including hiring teachers and doctors), than for allocating resources and reform efforts 
towards improving actual quality of education and health services, such as ensuring teacher 
and doctor attendance, or that school and clinic buildings are properly equipped.  
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Social Polarization and Provision of Services to the Poor 
Studies of electoral politics in India show that identity characteristics along ethnic, 
linguistic and religious lines dominate political behavior (Weiner and Field 1974). Similarly, 
in Nigeria, social cleavages along the lines of religion and ethnicity play a prominent role in 
determining political behavior. In socially polarized and/or ethnically fragmented societies, 
voters therefore tend to vote for those candidates they most closely identify with, 
irrespective of public performance and policy records; political competition between parties 
thus also concentrates on identity issues, and candidates are nominated from constituencies 
largely on the basis of demographic calculations of ethnicity and religion. Like uninformed 
voters, polarized voters are therefore also less able to hold politicians accountable for their 
performance in office. Public good provision should suffer most under these conditions, 
since politicians in polarized societies rarely internalize the society-wide costs and benefits of 
their policy decisions.  
These voting patterns are not the same as “ideological” voting in the United States 
or Western Europe. Surveys of voting behavior in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Campbell and others 1966) show that an overwhelming determinant of voting behavior is 
the ideological identification of voters with political parties. In this case, though, ideology 
has significant policy roots—in citizen identification with the perceived position of political 
parties on a wide range of social and economic issues.  
Why the difference between India and Nigeria, on the one hand, and the United 
States on the other? There are two possibilities. The implicit argument in much of the 
literature, is simply that members of the same ethnic, religious or social group value each 
others’ welfare much more than the welfare of members from other groups. As a 
consequence, the utility they derive from providing public goods to all is lower than it 
otherwise would be.  
A second possible explanation receives more attention in the next section of the 
paper: where political competitors are generally not credible, voters rely on personal 
connections to competitors to establish which are credible and likely to provide them 
benefits once in office. In the United States, parties have established credible positions on 
certain issues, which together comprise a package that attracts particular voters who then 
appear to be “ideologically” committed to the party—when in fact, they are committed to 
the policy positions with which those parties are credibly associated. In India and Nigeria, 
though, the problem is the reverse. Voters only believe promises from political candidates 
within their own ethnic or religious groups; those promises are therefore, necessarily, narrow 
and targeted to members of the respective ethnic group. Political promises for broad-based 
public services that cut across social groups are not credible.  
In a cross-country setting, Easterly and Levine (1997) find that ethnic diversity is 
negatively correlated with the provision of public goods such as the percentage of roads that  
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are paved, efficiency of the electricity network, and years of schooling of the population. For 
cities in the United States, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that shares of public 
spending on productive public goods—education, roads, sewers, and trash pick-up—are 
inversely related to the city’s ethnic fragmentation. Miguel (2001) concludes that higher 
levels of local ethnic diversity in Kenya are associated with sharply lower contributions to 
primary school funding and worse school facilities. These results are consistent with either 
theory of social polarization. Animus across ethnic groups explain these outcomes directly. 
However, if individual politicians can only make credible promises to members of their own 
ethnic groups, it makes little sense for them to provide public goods that benefit all ethnic 
groups. The credibility theory therefore also explains these findings.  
The effects of identity politics are much more dramatic when minority identities lack 
political power. They then suffer in public policy decisions decided by the majority. In India, 
Betancourt and Gleason (2000) find that districts with a higher proportion of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups with respect to caste and religion—the scheduled castes and 
Muslims—have lower public inputs in health and education. Similarly, Banerjee and 
Somanathan (2001) find that districts with a higher share of scheduled tribes in population 
receive significantly fewer “desirable” public goods. They also find some evidence that links 
the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and public good delivery to underlying 
political incentives—districts that are ethnically fragmented are also likely to be politically 
fragmented, in that elections in these districts are characterized by a larger number of 
contestants and a smaller vote share for the winning party. 
There is also substantial anthropological and anecdotal evidence in India that 
disadvantaged groups are systematically excluded from using public goods within their own 
villages by social processes of discrimination. Micro-level case studies and survey evidence 
from India show that within-village inequality in education access and achievement is 
significant, with the privileged castes in the village enjoying near-universal adult literacy for 
several decades while literacy rates are still close to zero among disadvantaged castes in the 
same village (Drèze and Sen 1996).  
The effects of increasing the political power of minority groups provides some 
indication that both problems of inter-group hostility and of credible commitments in 
political competition undermine public policy in polarized countries. India, for example, 
instituted political reservations for scheduled castes and tribes in the national and state 
legislative assemblies. Pande (2003) finds that mandated reservations in state legislatures 
resulted in increased public sector job quotas for scheduled castes in the public sector, but 
significantly lower resources allocated to education. The antagonism of the majority towards 
the scheduled castes and tribes explains why the greater political influence of the latter led to 
a change in benefits. However, the fact that politicians find it difficult to make credible 
promises about public goods across ethnic and caste groups explains why public good 
provision—education—declined.   
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Because the newly emergent representatives of the disadvantaged groups could make 
credible appeals only to their ethnic groups, they favored targeted rather than broad public 
goods, even when the benefits to their groups would have been higher, per rupee expended, 
from the latter. Mandated reservations may in fact improve the equity of targeted transfer 
programs, but worsen overall social service delivery by strengthening clientelist relations and 
reducing incentives of political competitors to invest in broad policy reputations across the 
electorate.  
Unfortunately, though parties could gain by attempting to build such reputations, 
there are also strong political incentives in the opposite direction. As Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2002) have shown in the case of the city of Boston, as the experience of Zimbabwe makes 
self-evident, and has been the case throughout history, politicians can often gain political 
advantage by fanning ethnic divisions. In the limit, as in Boston or Zimbabwe, electoral 
advantage is cemented by simply pushing the out-of-power ethnic group out of the 
jurisdiction.  
Credibility and the Provision of Social Services 
As the previous sections have foreshadowed, credibility influences the provision of 
social services in two important ways. First, credibility sharpens the effects of competitive 
elections on politician incentives. When campaign promises are not credible—when it costs 
election winners little to abandon them—electoral competition has relatively modest effects 
on service provision. Public goods are likely to be under-provided in less credible political 
environments. One aspect of this has already been discussed: when the quality of social 
services is difficult for voters to observe, voters cannot easily verify whether quality public 
goods have been provided or not. Absent this verification, politicians have an incentive to 
under-provide relative to what they have promised.  
The notion of political credibility and its implications for public policies has only just 
begun to be explored, and as yet there is little available in terms of a systematic and rigorous 
development of the determinants of credibility. Credibility is conceptually close to 
reputation, and reputation depends on social/legal institutions available to enforce promises, 
or can be developed over repeated interactions. Old democracies may develop political 
credibility through recurrent elections over a period of time. Credibility of political promises 
may therefore be a particular problem in developing countries that are newly democratizing, 
and hence have not developed political reputations, or because overall social, economic, and 
legal institutions are not conducive to establishing reputations. 
Reputation can also develop for the “wrong” policies when there is uncertainty 
about the most effective instruments to achieve particular public objectives, and the history 
of political competition may lead to a “bad” equilibrium where only certain promises, for 
inefficient policies, are credible. For example, new democracies established in poor,  
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agricultural economies have historically adopted poverty reduction strategies focusing on 
subsidies for consumption and agricultural production, at the expense of broad public 
services that may perhaps have higher returns in terms of poverty impact and economic 
growth. But once political reputations are established for particular policies, even if these 
policies are sub-optimal they will receive greater public resources than if all political promises 
were credible.  
Second, credibility affects the types of public goods that politicians offer. In 
countries where voters believe political leaders are less secure in their positions, they place 
less value on promises by political competitors to improve the quality of education, which 
are of no value unless they are carried out for a substantial period of time, and more value 
on promises whose benefits are immediately realized. These two factors are discussed in 
greater detail in the sections that follow.  
The Credibility of Political Promises and the Impact of Clientelism on Social Service 
Delivery 
The earlier discussion emphasizes that when pre-electoral promises are not credible, 
elections become less effective devices for holding politicians accountable. Under two 
scenarios of non-credibility reviewed earlier, voters can either coordinate on ex post 
performance standards, as in Ferejohn (1986) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), turning out 
incumbents that fail to meet them and mitigating the credibility problem, or they cannot, as 
in Robinson and Verdier (2002), rendering elections useless. In these models, public goods 
are underprovided, targeted transfers are not provided at all, and rent-seeking is high. We 
know, however, that politicians in developing countries are deeply concerned about their 
ability to deliver targeted transfers to constituents. At the same time, we know that political 
party development and other indicators of credibility in political systems are weak in many of 
these countries. If politicians are credible, but only to individual voters with whom they have 
built up a personal reputation, both rent-seeking and targeted transfers are high, as we 
observe. Keefer (2002b) argues that this “partial” credibility explains the policy outcomes we 
observe in less credible democracies, including the phenomenon of vote buying. 
In such countries, the foundation of a politician’s credibility is not based on the 
politician’s policy record or history of policy stances, bolstered perhaps by the policy record 
of the political party to which the politician belongs. Some voters believe some politicians 
who have, for example, shown themselves to be reliable sources of personal assistance. 
These might be locally influential people who have helped families with loans or jobs or 
assistance with legal or bureaucratic difficulties. In the absence of well-developed political 
parties or national party leaders who are more broadly credible to voters, the promises of 
such influential people are all that voters can rely on in making electoral choices.  
The credibility of pre-electoral promises only to clients has precise implications for 
policy: the greater the emphasis on building credibility through personalized exchange, the  
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greater the focus of government spending on items targeted to specific individuals (clients) 
and, ultimately, the less spent on public goods. Promises of buildings and government jobs 
become the currency of political competition at the expense of universal access to high 
quality education and health care. The former can be targeted to individuals and small 
groups of voters (clients) and therefore are clearly seen as evidence of political patrons 
fulfilling their promises to clients. Universal access is by definition not easily targeted. 
Improvements in quality are also difficult to target, to the extent that they are difficult for 
voters to attribute to politicians.12  
Evidence supports the notion that clientelist governments have a stronger than 
average preference for targeted infrastructure provision and tend to be more corrupt than 
average. For example, Keefer (2002b) argues that the age of democracy is one important 
characteristic of countries that influences whether political competitors are non-credible or 
clientelist or not. Because they are young, with fewer years and elections with which to have 
built up policy reputations, political competitors are less likely to be able to make credible 
promises to all voters and are more likely to rely on clientelist promises (targeted promises to 
specific individuals or groups to whom they can make credible promises for various reasons, 
including past dealings with them). In fact, targeted spending—public investment—is higher 
in young democracies than in old. Moreover, as young democracies age and the number of 
clients rises, targeted spending in the form of public investment increases. Keefer (2002b) 
also reports that corruption falls as democracies age, and that corruption is significantly 
higher in young than in established democracies.  
These results are relevant for social service delivery since social services are likely to 
be of lower quantity when public investment is high and of lower quality when corruption is 
high. Qualitative evidence from Pakistan supports this contention. Competitive elections 
were a regular feature of the political landscape of Pakistan during the 1990s, but credible 
promises by political parties or political leaders to voters were supported largely by clientelist 
relationships and related to targeted transfers rather than broad public policies. There is little 
evidence of political competition on the basis of broad policy promises, nor of distinctions 
among the major parties regarding their stances on broad policy issues. One would expect 
the provision of broad-based public goods in such an environment to be low and the 
provision of targeted goods to be emphasized. In fact, compared to countries with similar 
incomes per capita and demographic characteristics (age and proportion rural), access to 
potable water in Pakistan in 2000 was 25 percentage points higher than expected. 
Investments in potable water, particularly in rural areas where they consist largely of well-
drilling, are particularly easy to target and their benefits are immediately accessible and 
                                                 
12 Voters cannot distinguish whether the quality or attendance of teachers has improved because of 
their own pressure on the teacher, because the teachers themselves decided to do a better job, because of a 
generalized reform in teacher quality that is affecting all teachers and education beneficiaries, or because of 
the targeted intervention of a particular politician.   
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observable. Primary school enrollment, though, was 20 percentage points less than one 
would have expected, controlling for the same variables (World Bank 2002).13  
Horizon Problems and Credibility 
A second credibility problem emerges when political competitors, whose term in 
office is expected to be short, make promises that are credible for as long as they are in 
office. This leaves them unable to credibly promise to implement projects that require a 
longer time period to bear fruit. This matters little if the promises concern jobs or public 
works projects, which, in principle, can be fulfilled with little delay after an election and 
whose benefits can be quickly realized and recognized by voters. However, shortened 
political horizons render other government services, such as education, considerably less 
useful.  
Education must be received for a certain minimum period of time before recipients 
realize any benefits from them. This is particularly true in the early years: schooling yields 
few benefits until students achieve literacy and numeracy, but this may not occur before the 
fourth grade. Using data from Spain, Sanmartín (2001) finds generally low returns to 
education prior to 10
th grade, but a spike in returns to education upon completion of the 
fourth grade. Glewwe and Jacoby (1994), in examining the determinants of student 
achievement in Ghana, gave subjects a basic reading and mathematics test. Performance by 
those who had not advanced beyond grade school was so poor that they were excluded from 
the sample and the authors focused on middle school achievers only. To the extent that 
education also serves a signaling function, the horizon problem worsens: receipt of the 
credential generates a discrete jump in the returns of the previous years of schooling, but the 
credential can only be received after a certain number of years of schooling.14  
The horizon problem can have a significant impact on voter decisionmaking. 
Recalling the earlier example of 30 families, each with a school age child. They can choose 
between a politician who promises to provide a job and a politician who promises to staff 
the empty school with a qualified teacher from outside of the 30 families. Prior to the 
election, they do not know which family will get the job, so the expected value to each family 
of the job is 1/30 of the salary. If the teacher is certain to stay for five years, each child 
becomes numerate and literate, raising expected lifetime income. Otherwise, there is no 
                                                 
13 Another, complementary explanation taken up in just the next section is political instability. For 
decades Pakistan has been marked by considerable political instability. The tenure of incumbent leaders 
was frequently cut short (three times in the 1990s). This would also have generated a marked preference for 
the provision by government of goods that generate benefits immediately and would not be dependent on 
the decisions of future governments. 
14 The magnitude of the signaling effect is contentious, particularly for primary and secondary 
education. Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) strongly dispute it, but Hungerford and Solon (1987) claim 
to find convincing evidence of it.  
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benefit to education. If politician promises are credible over five years, the voters prefer the 
teacher; otherwise, they do not.  
Again, indirect evidence suggests political horizons affect government policies with 
long-term effects, like education. Clague and others (1996) consider the security of property 
rights, another outcome of state institutions that is sensitive to the horizons over which 
government actors can make credible promises. They make the argument that the older is a 
regime (the years a country is democratic or that an autocrat is in power), the longer is the 
horizon of the political decisionmakers. The evidence they present suggests that the security 
of property rights is higher in both older democracies and older dictatorships. Keefer and 
Knack (2002) find as well that productive public investment—the payoffs to which are 
largely in the future—fall when property rights are weak, while unproductive public 
investment—corruption and rent-seeking—rise. These results are suggestive, at least, that in 
the area of social service provision, particularly education is likely to suffer when the 
horizons over which government officials can make credible promises are short. 
The Dynamics of Political Competition and Provision of Social Services: Uttar 
Pradesh versus Kerala  
Some of the most striking contrasts in basic health and education outcomes exist 
between neighboring countries with comparable levels of economic development, and 
between regions within the same country—between Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the southern 
states of India on the one hand, and Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the northern states of India 
on the other. One such contrast, between the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and the 
southern state of Kerala in India, has been explored in depth by Drèze and Sen (1995, 1996). 
These two states exhibit almost identical levels of per capita income and poverty, but 
dramatically different outcomes in health and education. Drèze and Sen attribute these stark 
differences to the divergent nature of public action in these respective states. We reinterpret 
their example to emphasize the differences in political incentives of policy-makers across the 
two states to provide social services to all.  
Table 1 (based on data presented in Drèze and Sen 1996) summarizes this contrast. 
Human development outcomes in Kerala are comparable to some of the richest nations of 
the world, while those in UP are similar to those in the poorest nations of the world, despite 
the two having very similar economies, levels of per capita income, and poverty. Figure 1 
suggests that the difference in human development outcomes is due, at least in part, to the 
striking differences in real per capita public expenditures on health and education in the two 
states. Over four decades from the 1960s to the 1990s, average real per capita spending in 




Table 1. Contrasting Experience in Social Services 
  India Uttar  Pradesh  (UP)  Kerala 
Per capita income at current prices 1991-92 (in 
Indian rupees) 
5,583 4,012  4,618 
Poverty headcount ratio, 1987-88 (%)  44.9  47.7  44 
Real (1992 Rs) per capita public spending on 
education, 1985-92  
228 147  309 
Real (1992 Rs) per capita public spending on health, 
1985-92 
70 49  82 
Literacy rate, age 7+, 1991 (%)       
Female 39.3  25.3  86.2 
Male 64.1  55.7  93.6 
Percentage of rural children aged 12-14 who have 
never been enrolled in a school, 1986-87 
    
Female 51  68  1.8 
Male 26  27  0.4 
Proportion of persons aged 6 and above who have 
completed primary education, 1992-93 
    
Female 28.1  21.4  60.5 
Male 48.6  47.3  65.8 
Proportion of children aged 12-23 months who 
have not received any vaccination, 1992-93 
30 43  11 
Proportion of recent births preceded by an 
antenatal check-up, 1992-93 
49 30  97 
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births, 1990-92  80  98  17 
Proportion of villages with medical facilities, 1981  14  10  96 
Source: Drèze and Sen (1995, 1996); Public spending numbers from annual publications of the Reserve Bank of 
India Bulletin on state finances in India; India-wide numbers on public spending only for 15 major states. 
 
 
Source: For nominal public expenditures, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, various issues. Public spending data 
refers to spending on the current account, the largest category of state government expenditures which includes 
the bulk of spending on health and education. Price deflator and population from World Bank India Poverty 
Database (Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion 1996). 
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Figures 2a and 2b show spending on health and education and spending on state 
administration alone (on the overall organs of the state, interest payments, pensions, etc., 
that is, exclusive of spending on public services) as a proportion of total expenditures in the 
two states since 1960 to 1998. Kerala started out in the early decades of electoral 
competition investing more than three times the proportion of its public resources in social 
services compared to UP. Largely because of the growing debt burden in both states which 
increased the share of resources going towards interest payments (included under state 
administrative spending), they have converged to similar levels of spending, in proportional 




Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, various issues. Public spending data refers to spending on the current 
account, the largest category of state government expenditures which includes the bulk of spending on health 
and education. 











































































































If spending on health and education is less easy to target than other types of 
spending, as seems to be the case, then the allocation differences across the two states reflect 
stronger preferences in UP for targeted spending. The quality of public services is 
indisputably harder to target and here the evidence is clear: the quality and effectiveness of 
public spending are higher in Kerala. Drèze and Sen review extensive evidence that public 
schools and health clinics in Kerala have high teacher and physician attendance, are well 
supplied, adequately maintained, and widely utilized; similar facilities in UP simply lie 
abandoned.  
Why? The formal political and legal institutions in the two states are the same and 
both states lie within a single sovereign nation. Both have had regular elections to their 
legislative assemblies since the 1950s , monitored by the Election Commission of India and 
in accordance with constitutional procedures. Hence the answer cannot lie in differences 
between political institutions per se, but in the dynamics of political competition. Specifically, 
and consistent with the discussion in the first part of this paper, Kerala’s voters are better 
informed and less polarized on non-policy dimensions than voters in UP, and its political 
parties compete on credible platforms for delivering broad social services, as compared to 
clientelist platforms in UP.  
Kerala entered the era of democratic elections with a substantially literate, informed, 
and politically active electorate. In contrast, the state of UP entered the new era of 
democracy with a population of largely illiterate voters with limited access to widely 
published information, and active institutions of social discrimination which effectively 
prevented the so-called “backward castes” from accessing public services, or perhaps from 
participating in political processes. Although caste issues also existed in Kerala, poor and 
socially disadvantaged voters were more likely to participate in political processes to 
influence policy issues affecting their welfare (Nossiter 1982; Chander 1986). 
These differences affected political party competition and the likelihood that credible 
political competitors would emerge to contest elections. Following independence from 
British colonial rule, the Congress Party was the dominant party in India; it had the widest 
national presence, the most solid reputation, related to its association with the fight for 
independence, and the longest presence as a political party. Congress espoused a common 
socialist platform throughout India, focusing on state-led development and redistribution to 
the poor. However, at the state level there was substantial variation in the perception of the 
Congress Party by voters, the extent and nature of competition confronting the Congress 
Party, and the types of credible promises to voters that the party could or had to make to be 
successful.  
In many states, such as in UP, Congress did not confront vigorous competition from 
credible and well-organized parties. In others, credible challenges to the Congress were 
mounted by regional parties and newly emerging communist parties. In Kerala, the  
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communist parties were particularly active and invested substantially in mobilizing the 
poorest voters, and by repeatedly interacting with these voters, developed the ability to make 
credible promise to them (Chander 1986; Nossiter 1982). Competition in Kerala was 
therefore between two credible political parties, the Congress and communist parties, both 
able to make promises to broad segments of society. This diminished the importance of 
patron-client relationships, to an extent that was unparalleled in any other state.  
In UP, on the other hand, massive voter illiteracy suggests that voters were also 
poorly informed about the connection between political decisionmaking and their well-
being. This undermined the ability of any party to make credible promises to voters, since 
reputation with voters is difficult to establish if voters are poorly informed. Moreover, in 
conditions of visible and often coercive social discrimination, organization of the victims of 
discrimination was in any case highly costly. Drèze and Gazdar (1996) recount how a village 
school in UP can be non-functional for as long as ten years due to teacher absenteeism and 
shirking, without any collective protest being organized. Mencher (1980), on the other hand, 
describes how in Kerala, if a primary health center were to be unmanned for a few days, 
there would be massive demonstrations at the nearest district office, with people demanding 
redress.  
Perhaps as a reflection of more informed voting along policy dimensions in Kerala, 
and greater credibility of political parties, voter turnout in the state has been historically 
higher than in any other state, averaging over 75 percent even in the first few state elections. 
In contrast, turnout in UP in the first few elections averaged 55 percent, which is suggestive 
of greater voter apathy to policy issues, because of the combination of lack of information, 
greater social polarization, and lack of credibility of political parties.  
On the one hand, then, the Congress Party could not make credible promises related 
to its socialist platform of redistribution to the poor in UP. On the other hand, given the 
absence of challengers, there was no political payoff to the Congress Party from making 
such promises. In fact, the Congress party won on average more than 70 percent of the seats 
in the state assembly (numbers based on data provided in Butler, Lahiri, and Roy 1995). In 
Kerala, the payoff to broad public good promises was high, both because competing political 
parties could make them credibly, and because neither party could offer the same level of 
benefits to broadly mobilized constituents through expensive, targeted programs that they 
could offer through broad-based, high quality service provision. In UP, there was little 
political payoff to competing on the basis of broad public goods or redistributive programs; 
narrow, targeted goods and services, despite their limited impact on welfare, were politically 
superior.  
Spending decisions in the early years following independence are also consistent with 
the absence of parties able to make credible promises to large fractions of the voting 
population in Uttar Pradesh. As Figures 2a and 2b show, Kerala’s public resources were 
overwhelmingly allocated to education and health services in the early decades of democracy,  
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constituting 45 percent of total expenditures, with correspondingly fewer resources (less 
than 30 percent) spent on state administration (largely, jobs going to non-service providers). 
In UP, during this same period, expenditures were concentrated in state administration, 
comprising almost 50 percent of the total, while health and education received less than 25 
percent of public resources.. The circumstances in Kerala distinguished it as well from most 
Indian states, since on average the major Indian states spent approximately 30 percent of 
total spending on health and education and over 40 percent on state administration. 
Moreover, expenditures in Kerala were effective—politicians made promises and had 
to keep them. The first two decades of elected state government saw dramatic improvements 
in human development indicators. Infant mortality declined about 43 percent, for instance, 
between 1956 and 1966 (Krishnan 1991). This decline has largely been attributed to high 
female literacy (which was also expanding through state programs in education) but was 
clearly facilitated by access to public primary health care, and state-sponsored programs of 
infant and child immunization (Zachariah 1992). Early political success in delivering high 
quality public health and education bolstered the credibility of political promises in this area 
and allowed electoral competition on the platform of social service provision to be sustained. 
No such progress or evolution was evident in Uttar Pradesh, where absenteeism and other 
indications of widespread shortfalls in service delivery suggest that even those resources 
spent on education and health were largely another font of political patronage, in the form 
of targeted jobs for teachers and health workers.  
UP is not immune to the fact that it is only one state in a country with well-
developed democratic institutions; these have slowly penetrated the social landscape in the 
state over the past fifty years, especially through the political mobilization of traditionally 
repressed lower castes. However, the pattern established early on in UP has proven difficult 
to change. Although new parties could, in principle, have attempted to establish state-wide 
policy reputations, this is costly in social environments such as that in UP, where incumbents 
have many tools at their disposal to block such entry. Ethnic or caste links to political 
candidates are the only connections that voters in UP believe will give them access to state 
resources. As a consequence, new political parties have organized along caste lines and 
compete on explicitly clientelist platforms—on the basis of narrow, targeted promises, the 
only promises that are politically useful in such an environment.  
Among the three main parties competing in the state today, the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) appeals to upper caste Hindus, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) to so-called 
backward castes, scheduled castes and tribes, and minority religion groups (hence the 
complementary set to upper caste Hindus), and the Samajwadi Party (SP) to similarly 
marginalized groups along the lines of religion and caste. Clientelist politics in Uttar Pradesh 
is well illustrated by the BSP platform, currently the dominant political party in the state 
legislature. The party simply does not print any election manifesto to explain its platform. It 
does, however, publicize the ethnic profile of its candidate list to demonstrate commitment  
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to its single point program of proportional representation for every ethnic group in the 
bureaucratic institutions of the state (Chandra 1999).  
This example of the contrast between Kerala and UP demonstrates that the same 
formal institutions of democracy can sustain very different forms of electoral competition 
with substantial impact on the quality of public services supported by the state. Policy 
interventions and electoral institutions that change the information processing capacity of 
voters, impact ideological fragmentation, and the capacity of politicians to make credible 
commitments, can potentially make a significant difference for the process of political 
competition and hence for the provision of broad social services. Further research is needed 
to evaluate the impact of ongoing political and institutional reforms in the developing world, 
and to draw lessons from the existing variation in institutions across countries. Where poor 
voters are already active in political processes the real issue is that of bolstering the credibility 
of political candidates to provide broad social services, with a corresponding reduction in 
existing political pressures to pursue clientelist policies.  
Conclusion: Policy Implications and Further Research 
As the Millennium Development Goals make clear, development policy has turned 
ever more emphatically to a focus on improving the condition of the poor. Essential to that 
effort are the quality and quantity of social services provided to the poor by governments. At 
the same time, and in parallel, there is an increasing awareness that “institutions matter” for 
development. Moreover, recent, extensive and rigorous work by social scientists has revealed 
a great deal about the impact of electoral competition and a broad array of political and 
electoral institutions on policy outcomes. In this paper, we attempt to join these two parallel 
lines of argument to answer the question: what impact does electoral competition and 
political decisionmaking have on social service outcomes to the poor? 
Theory and evidence suggests that the impact is large, and largest for those social 
services such as education and health that are most important to the poor. Information gaps, 
social polarization and the absence of credible political competitors lead to the 
underprovision of government services to the least informed, to the most polarized and to 
the vast majority who do not have personal connections with a powerful patron.  
Though there are many important efforts experimenting with different ways to 
improve the ability of the poor to secure their own interests in government decisionmaking, 
to “empower” them, the design of these typically does not explicitly address the underlying 
political market imperfections. Legislative reservations for minority groups in India, 
decentralization in Pakistan, and participatory budgeting in Brazil, for example, are all most 
effective to the extent that they overcome the underlying political market imperfections that 
notably impair governments services to the poor. As the earlier discussion of the effects of  
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reservations in India suggests, the improvements wrought by these reforms may be only 
partial to the extent that they leave unchanged many aspects of the political marketplace.  
Two types of decentralization, in particular, are often seen as responses to 
inadequate central government attention to social service delivery. The political economy 
analysis here has implications for both: decentralization of responsibilities for the provision 
of local public goods to the level of locally elected village and municipal governments; and 
greater autonomy of decision-making at the level of service providers such as schools and 
clinics, with greater participation of citizens through community based organizations such as 
parent-teacher associations and health committees. 
For decentralization to have a positive impact on social services, the following 
conditions must be satisfied—one, voters must be more likely to use information about the 
quality of local public goods in making their voting decisions for local elections; and two, 
political promises to voters at large must be more credible, than when decision-making over 
local public goods was in the hands of regional or national governments. Theoretically, the 
impact of decentralization on informed voting and political credibility can go in either 
direction. Voters may use more information about local public goods in their voting 
decisions because such information is easier to come by and coordinate upon, perhaps given 
a more restricted set of responsibilities and greater observability of actions of local 
governments; and political agents may have greater credibility because of proximity to the 
community and reputation developed through social interaction over an extended period of 
time.  
On the other hand, local voters may be apathetic to local elections and have little or 
no information about the resource availability and capability of local governments, if 
resources are concentrated in higher tiers of government; social polarization may be more 
intense at more local levels due to age-old differences across settled communities, and 
perhaps weaker at the national level owing to national campaigns of nation-building; and 
clientelist promises to a few voters may be easier to make and fulfill due to closer social 
relations between the elected representatives and their clients (see Keefer, Narayan and 
Vishwanath 2003, for a more extensive discussion of these issues).  
Decentralization right down to the level of service providers and communities may 
potentially address the problem of credibility of elected political agents. Remotely located 
political agents are not able to credibly promise to improve quality of services in such 
transactions-intensive sectors such as health and education, where the quality of provision 
depends critically on day-to-day provider behavior, at most only committing to providing 
infrastructure, equipment, and salaries. If education service delivery responsibility is 
completely centralized, for example, then the problem of political credibility in monitoring 
providers may lead to empty school buildings and absent teachers, where school 
construction is useful for political kick-backs, and teacher posts for extending political 
patronage, with otherwise poor incentives for improving the quality of schooling. But if  
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decentralized user monitoring of providers is institutionalized, then voters need only verify 
whether political agents have made resources available for schools and clinics in order to 
decide whether to reward or punish them at election times.15  
Additional and complementary efforts can improve outcomes in areas where 
decentralization or other existing reforms might fall short. For example, few reforms 
systematically correct the political market distortions due to information. Such a reform 
would, for example, provide independent validation about the quality of public goods and 
the scope of accomplishment and failure of individual political decisionmakers. In well-
established democracies, competing and credible political parties provide this oversight. In 
addition, and more usefully in less-developed democracies, the press can provide validation, 
but so also can external agencies and civic groups or “civil society.” Survey instruments, such 
as citizen report cards that consolidate public feedback on the state of government services, 
are potentially powerful vehicles for mobilizing voters around the issue of quality of public 
services, although their impact is yet to be evaluated rigorously.  
Credibility, like information, is particularly likely to be problematic in developing 
countries and also requires special attention. Here the key is to bring together two key 
strands of assistance to countries; one strand, by far the most important, to provide support 
for better education or health outcomes, and the other strand, to support political party 
development and the development of political institutions. These strands are brought 
together when outside interventions that help politicians both implement and take credit for 
broad public good improvements can lead to sustainable improvement in public good 
provision, if they help politicians build a reputation for performance. This is challenging – it 
means specifically that aid be provided for education and health especially in those cases 
where politicians have made emphatic, public and verifiable promises regarding health and 
education, which is not common in many developing democracies.  
Finally, social polarization can have harmful effects on social service provision, just 
as on other aspects of civic life. One response of outside intervention is to insist that criteria 
other than those related to social cleavages determine access to resources. This may not be 
practical; for example, if one group is poorer than the other, redistributional transfers on the 
basis of income will always favor that group. Other responses depend on the sources of 
polarization.  
The response to pure taste-based affiliations (voting systematically for the 
representatives of one particular ethnic group or tribe out of an exogenous and strong 
preference for anyone from that group or tribe over any other candidate) demands 
educational responses to moderate these tendencies. Strong signals from the center about 
the inappropriateness of such behavior or preferences can, over time, soften them, if not 
                                                 
15 This solution is limited to the extent that central government intervention is needed either to 
remedy disparities in performance or funding across jurisdictions, however.  
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eliminate them entirely. However, if polarization is due to tremendous imperfections in 
political and economic markets, as is more often the case, so that people retreat into the 
groups with which they have the strongest personal links and the greatest hope of accessing 
resources, the appropriate response is to assist in reforms that remove those imperfections.  
The understanding of political market imperfections reflected in this paper is a 
product of recent literature. Less is known about which reforms can feasibly correct these 
imperfections. A natural and important agenda for future research therefore falls out of this 
discussion. For example, understanding the impact of decentralization reforms (which 
institutional designs work and which do not), is an empirical issue. Since most of the reforms 
across countries with very different historical and institutional backgrounds is only just 
beginning to be implemented, there is a tremendous opportunity to rigorously evaluate the 
impact of different institutional designs on both actual outcomes, in terms of quality of 
public goods, and on the process of political competition so that lessons can be applied to 
very different institutional contexts across the world. 
Similarly, there are examples of particular experiences from around the globe of how 
“information campaigns” regarding public services have succeeded. However, we have no 
evidence for whether instruments of this kind significantly and systematically alter the nature 
of political competition. Further research would be valuable on the nature of information 
availability and processing by poor voters, and how information provision mechanisms can 
be institutionalized to enable these voters to provide stronger incentives for politicians to 
improve performance of public services.16  
Finally, more, innovative research is required on the impact of credibility on policy 
outcomes. Under what conditions do politicians move from promising only targeted 
transfers, as in most developing democracies, to broad and continuous improvements in 
service quality (for example, as evidenced by debates in the United States over national 
testing of all students in public schools)? Even unpacking the basic notion of “credibility” 
and understanding its process of change remains an important area for further inquiry. The 
rewards to such research, however, are likely to be enormous, since it would vastly improve 
our understanding of distressingly vast differences in government performance around the 
world.  
                                                 
16 Evidence concerning the role of the media naturally gives rise to the question: under what 
conditions is free (or low cost) media informative? Several authors have examined the conditions of 
competition in political and economic markets and the resulting incentives for the kind and quantity of 
information disseminated by the media industry (Strömberg 2002; Djankov and others 2003; Mullainathan 
and Shliefer 2002).  
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